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Introdudion 
If n 1997, in an exercise emphasizing infrastructure security, the National Se-
lLcurity Agency e:A1'osed the United States' vulnerability to the disruption of 
computer operations at our major military commands at the hands of a hostile 
State or an organization with hostile intent.! A year earlier, US authorities had 
detected the introduction of a program, called a "sniffer," into computers at 
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, that permitted the perpetrator to down-
load a large volume of complex telemetry information transmitted from satel-
lites. The Deputy Attorney General reported that the "sniffer" had remained in 
place for a significant period of time. 2 Of equal concern, an FBI report in 1999 
detailed Chinese efforts to attack US Government information systems, includ-
ing the White House network.3 These actual and projected interstate intrusions 
into Government computer networks once thought secure raise important 
questions concerning what, if any, rights in self-defense are triggered by such at-
tacks. More importantly, they pose the issue of how the right of self-defense, if 
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an attack impacts a vital national security interest, would be translated into effec-
tive rules of engagement, specifically, legally defensible targeting decisions. 
Understanding the Threat 
The world of information operations represents an environment created by 
the confluence of cooperative networks of computers, information systems, and 
telecommunication infrastructures. The concern addressed here relates to the 
threat posed to these systems when operations are unlawfully disrupted, denied, 
or degraded, or when secure information that is stored in computers or com-
puter networks is destroyed, compromised, or altered in such a way that it has a 
destructive effect on the national security interests of a nation. Computer espio-
nage and computer network attacks, as well as the subversion of political, eco-
nomic, and/or non-military information bearing on a nation's capabilities and 
vulnerabilities, may well constitute an unlawful use of force warranting a mili-
tary response under traditional international law principles. 
The threshold issues which emerge are: (1) which peacetime interstate activi-
ties within the telecommunications highway constitute a threat or use of force; 
(2) when does such a threat constitute an attack under the international law such 
that a right to use force in self-defense exists; and (3) what is an appropriate re-
sponse. To respond to these issues, we must understand the military applications 
of information technology. This requires an understanding of the Internet. The 
Internet was originally a network of computers linked by telecommunications 
infrastructure and managed by the Department of Defense (DoD) in the 1970s. 
The internal computer networks of universities and private research facilities 
were merged through the development ofhypertext, created in 1989 as the pri-
mary platform of the Internet. It (hypertext) translates diverse computer proto-
cols into standard format. 
This hypertext process, while extremely beneficial to both the military and 
civilian sectors, has created vulnerabilities. The World Wide Web, the full 
implementation of the Internet, which is at once the heart of the Defense Re-
form Initiative and key to the reengineering and streamlining of our business 
practices, can provide adversaries with a potent instrument to obtain, corre-
late, evaluate, and adversely affect an unprecedented volume of aggregated 
information critical to proper management of DoD and US infrastructure 
capabilities. 
This chapter responds to these attacks on US infrastructure. Even though in-
ternationallaw could not have anticipated specific information warfare concerns 
when the Hague Conventions of 1899, addressing means and methods of 
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warfare, were negotiated, the drafters thereof did antJ.clpate technological 
change. The "Martens Clause," included within both Hague Convention II 
1899, and Hague Convention IV 1907, provides that even in cases not explicitly 
covered by specific agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the pro-
tection and authority of principles of international law derived from established 
custom, principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience, and there-
fore are not left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders.4 This provi-
sion was considered necessary to prevent future unnecessary and/or 
disproportionate destruction from weapons systems not yet developed. The 
drafters had just witnessed unimaginable carnage in the Crimean War and the 
American Civil War resulting from advanced rifling techniques and other inno-
vations, and were cognizant that warfare was rapidly changing. As Greenberg, et 
al., so accurately state, as a result of the Martens Clause, "attacks will be judged 
largely by their effects, rather than by their methods."5 
The Legal Parameters for Response 
UN Charter System 
The existing legal regime available to deter destructive actions through 
computer technology includes the United Nations Charter system and cus-
tomary international law. The basic provision restricting the threat or use of 
force in international relations is Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. That 
provision states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations."6 
The underlying purpose of Article 2(4), to regulate aggressive behavior be-
tween States, is identical to that of its precursor, the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. Article 12 of the Covenant stated that League members were obliged 
not to "resort to war."7 This terminology, however, left unmentioned actions 
which, although clearly hostile, could not be considered to constitute acts of 
war. The drafters of the UN Charter wished to ensure that the legal niceties of 
a conflict's status did not preclude cognizance by the international body. Thus, 
in drafting Article 2(4), the term "war" was replaced by the phrase "threat or 
use of force." The wording was interpreted as prohibiting a broad range of 
hostile activities including not only "war" and other equally destructive con-
flicts, but also applications of force of a lesser intensity or magnitude. 8 
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UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 
The United Nations General Assembly has clarified the scope of Article 2 in 
two important resolutions, both adopted unanimously.9 Resolution 2625, the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, describes behavior which constitutes the 
"unlawful threat or use offorce" and enumerates standards of conduct by which 
States must abide.1o Contravention of any of these standards of conduct is de-
clared to be in violation of Article 2(4).11 
UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 
Resolution 3314, The Definition of Aggression, provides a detailed state-
ment on the meaning of "aggression" and defines it as "the use of armed force by 
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political integrity or politi-
cal independence of another State, or in any manner inconsistent "\vith the Char-
ter of the United Nations. "12 This resolution contains a list of acts which qualify 
as acts of aggression. Included in the list is "the use of any weapon by a State 
against the territory of another State."13 The resolution provides that the State 
which commits an act of aggression violates international law as embodied in the 
Charter. 14 
The actions of States or their surrogates in supporting or taking part in acts 
of aggression through information technology that threaten vital national in-
terests of a State or States, whether through disruption of military infor-
mation downlinks in satellites, sabotage of vital computer networks, or infiltration 
of electronic commercial transmission systems, clearly fall within the scope 
of Article 2(4).15 
The Relationship Between Customary International Law and the Charter 
When the UN Charter was drafted in 1945, the right of self-defense was the 
only included exception to the prohibition of the use offorce. Customary inter-
national law had previously accepted reprisal, retaliation, and retribution as le-
gitimate responses as well. Reprisal allows a State to commit an act that is 
otherwise illegal to counter the illegal act of another State. Retaliation is the in-
fliction on the delinquent State of the same injury that it has caused the victim. 
Retribution is a criminal law concept, implying vengeance, that is sometimes 
used loosely in the international law context as a synonym for retaliation. While 
debate continues as to the present status of these responses, the US position has 
always been that actions protective of US interests, rather than being punitive in 
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nature, offer the greatest hope of securing a lasting, peaceful resolution ofinter-
national conflict.16 
The right of self-defense was codified in Article 51 of the Charter. That article 
provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right ofindi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations .... "17 The use of the word "inherent" in the text of Article 
51 suggests that self-defense is broader than the immediate Charter parameters. 
During the drafting of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, for example, the United 
States expressed its views as follows: 
There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or 
impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every 
sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and 
regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it 
alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in 
self-defense. 18 
Because self-defense is an inherent right, its contours have been shaped by 
custom and are subject to customary interpretation. Although the drafters of Ar-
ticle 51 may not have anticipated its use in protecting States from destructive ac-
tions perpetrated through technological means, international law has long 
recognized the need for flexible application. Former Secretary of State George 
Shultz emphasized this point when he stated that: "The UN Charter is not a sui-
cide pact. The law is a weapon on our side and it is up to us to use" it to its maxi-
mum extent."19 The final clause of Article 2(4) supports this interpretation and 
forbids the threat or use of force "in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations."20 
The late Professor Myres McDougal, ofy ale Law School, has placed the rela-
tionship between Articles 2(4) and 51 in clearer perspective: 
Article 2(4) refers to both the threat and use of force and commits the Members to 
refrain from the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent \vith the Purposes of the 
United Nations;" the customary right of self-defense, as limited by the requirements 
of necessity and proportionality, can scarcely be regarded as inconsistent with the 
purpose of the United Nations, and a decent respect for balance and effectiveness 
would suggest that a conception of impermissible coercion, which includes threats of 
force, should be countered \vith an equally comprehensive and adequate conception 
ofpennissible or defensive coercion .... 21 
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Significant from Professor McDougal's interpretation is our correlative rec-
ognition of the right to counter the imminent threat of techno-violence as well 
as actual destructive acts of information warfare. This comprehensive concep-
tion of permissible or defensive actions, honoring appropriate response to threats 
of an imminent nature, is merely reflective of the customary international law. It 
is precisely this anticipatory element that is critical to an effective policy to coun-
ter destructive acts against critical information systems. This does not suggest the 
lack of international law restraints upon the determination of necessity for pre-
emptive action. Rather, it suggests that legitimate considerations for effective 
response to evidence of imminent destructive acts against critical communica-
tions infrastructure must be appraised in the total conte:l...'i: in which they occur. 
One aspect of this contextual appraisal of necessity, especially as it relates to re-
sponding after the fact to destructive acts against our critical information sys-
tems, concerns the issue of whether force can be considered necessary if peaceful 
measures are available to lessen the threat. To require a State to tolerate attacks 
on infrastructure critical to its security and/ or economic well-being without re-
sistance, on the grounds that peaceful means have not been exhausted, is absurd. 
Once an attack on critical infrastructure has occurred, the failure to consider a 
military response would play into the hands of those governments or groups 
who deny the relevance oflaw in their actions. The legal criteria for the propor-
tionate use offorce is established once a State or identifiable group-supported at-
tack on technical infrastructure critical to the security of the nation has taken 
place. No State is obliged to ignore an attack as irrelevant, and the imminent 
threat to the national security requires consideration of a response. 
A related, but more difficult, issue concerns the elapsed time between the at-
tack on critical infrastructure and the identification of the State or group respon-
sible. Admittedly, there must be some temporal relationship between a 
destructive act and the lawful defensive response. Nevertheless, it would be un-
reasonable to preclude the victim of techno-violence from redress, based upon a 
doctrinaire determination that the threat of further destructive intrusions into a 
critical system is no longer imminent, when the perpetrator's own actions have 
precluded immediate identification. 
The requirement of proportionality is linked to necessity. Professor 
McDougal and Dr. Feliciano define the rule as follows: 
Proportionality in coercion constitutes a requirement that responding coercion 
be limited in intensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary prompdy to 
secure the permissible objectives of self-defense. For present purposes, these 
objectives may be most comprehensively generalized as the conserving of 
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important values by compelling the opposing partiCIpant to terminate the 
condition which necessitates responsive coercion.22 
This definition simply requires a rational relationship between the nature of 
the attack and the nature of the response. Although the relationship need not ap-
proach precision, a nation subjected to an isolated intrusion and disruption of an 
important computer system may not be entitled to launch a strike on the of-
fender nation. Other canons of military practice, such as conservation of re-
sources, support the principle of restraint in defense. The United Nations has 
condemned as reprisals those defensive actions that greatly exceeded the provo-
cation.23 Where there is evidence that a continuation of destructive electronic 
sabotage will occur, beyond the triggering event, that could threaten the very fiber 
of a nation's ability to defend itself, however, a response beyond that related to the 
initial intrusion would be legally appropriate to counter the continuing threat. 
Because the real-time relationship between threat and threat recognition is 
often compressed in the techno-violence arena, strategy development is severely . 
limited \vith respect to the non-military initiatives that may be considered in re-
sponse to cyber-attack, although they are always the options of choice where 
available. Traditional means of conflict resolution, authorized by law and cus-
tomary practice, are often precluded because attacks on computer systems are, 
by nature, covert in execution, unacknowledged by the State or group sponsor, 
and practiced with silent effectiveness. 
It must be noted, however, that non-coercive efforts to avoid attacks on com-
puter systems and telecommunication networks are also important. Diplomatic 
action, alone or in concert with allies or international organizations with con-
ceivable successful impact upon a State or group considering such a cyber initia-
tive, should be considered and employed whenever possible. In 1998, for 
example, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 53170,24 an initiative of 
the Russian Federation, that called upon Member States "to promote at multi-
lateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of in-
formation security. "25 The United States supported this resolution with the 
follo\ving pertinent comments: 
The General Assembly's adoption of the resolution in plenary will launch the 
international community on a complex enterprise' encompassing many 
interrelated £actors which delegates ... do not ordinarily address. For example, 
the topic includes technical aspects that relate to global communications-as well 
as non-technical issues associated with econOlnic cooperation and trade, 
intellectual property rights, law enforcement, anti-terrorist cooperation, and 
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other issues that are considered in the Second and Sixth Committees. Further, the 
actions and programs of governments are by no means the only appropriate focus, 
for the initiative also involves important concerns of individuals, associations, 
enterprises, and other organizations that are active in the private sector.26 
Despite such international initiatives focusing upon multilateral cooperation, 
the opportunity to look to outside assistance in protecting secure transmissions 
and critical systems in circumstances where our national security is threatened, is 
likely illusory. That responsibility will most certainly remain exclusively within 
the National Command Authorities. 
Operational-Legal Considerations in Addressing Techno-Violence 
Operational Law Context Provided in Rules of Engagement 
The rules of necessity and proportionality in the information warfare scenario 
are given operational significance through rules of engagement (ROE). ROE 
are directives that a government may establish to define the circumstances and 
limitations under which its forces will initiate and continue responsive actions to 
eliminate the threat posed by an attack through technical or other means on 
critical communications/information infrastructure. In the US context, this 
ensures that the National Command Authorities' guidance for handling crisis re-
sponses to techno-violence and other threats is provided, through the Joint 
ChiefS of Staff aCS), to subordinate headquarters and deployed US forces both 
during armed conflict and in periods of crisis short of war. 
ROE reflect domestic law requirements and US commitments to interna-
tionallaw. They are impacted by political, as well as operational considerations. 
For the commander concerned with responding to a threat to his communica-
tions/ command and control infrastructure, ROE represent limitations or upper 
bounds on how to utilize defensive and/or responsive systems and forces, ,vith-
out diminishing the authority to effectively protect his own critical infrastruc-
ture from attack. 
Evolution of ]CS Rules of Engagement 
Techno-violence against a critical US computer system, whether informa-
tion, communications, or command and control-related, represents hostile ac-
tivity which may trigger the applicable ROE. Until June 1986, the only US 
peacetime ROE applicable worldwide were the JCS Peacetime ROE for US 
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Seaborne Forces. These ROE, which unti11986 served as the basis for all com-
mands' peacetime ROE, were designed exclusively for the maritime environ-
ment. In June 1986, Secretary of Defense Weinberger promulgated more 
comprehensive ROE for sea, air, and land operations worldwide.27 The 1986 
Peacetime ROE provided the on-scene commander with the flexibility to re-
spond to hostile intent, as well as hostile acts, and unconventional threats with 
minimum necessary force, and to limit the scope and intensity of the threat. 
The strategy underlying the 1986 ROE sought to terminate violence quickly 
and decisively on terms favorable to the United States. In October 1994, Sec-
retary of Defense Aspin approved the Standing Rules of Engagement for US 
Forces (SROE), which significantly broadened the scope of US national 
ROE.28 As established in the SROE, US policy, should deterrence fail, pro-
vides flexibility to respond to crises with options that are both proportional to 
the provocation and designed to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict, 
discourage escalation, and achieve political and military objectives. The in-
herent right of self-defense establishes the policy framework for the SROE. 
These SROE are intended to provide general guidelines on self-defense and are 
applicable worldwide to all echelons of command. Providing guidance govern-
ing the use offorce consistent with mission accomplishment, they are to be used, 
absent superseding guidance, in operations other than war, during transition 
from peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict. 
The eA-panded national guidance represented in the 1994 SROE, as further 
refined in the 2000 SROE, has greatly assisted in providing both clarity and flex-
ibility of action for our theater commanders. The approval by the Secretary of 
Defense has ensured consistency in the way all military commanders, wherever 
assigned, address unconventional threats such as those posed to our advanced 
command and control infrastructure systems when these systems or computer 
networks are destroyed, compromised, or altered so as to have a destructive ef-
fect on the national security interests of the nation. 
Targeting Considerations 
The SROE, as they relate to information warfare, are implemented through 
the law of targeting, a subset of the law of armed conflict. The law of targeting is 
based upon three fundamental principles. These are: 
• The right of States to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. 
• The launching of attacks against the civilian population as such is 
prohibited. 
429 
Responding to Attacks on Critical Computer Infrastructure 
• Distinctions must be made between combatants and noncombatants, to 
the effect that noncombatants are spared to the extent possible.29 
Because the law of armed conflict is an eminently practical law which takes 
into account military efficiency, these basic principles are also consistent with 
the response authorized for non-violent but equally destructive forms of coer-
cive activity, such as sabotage of critical defense computer systems. Moreover, 
targeting theory is premised upon practical considerations that serve the purpose 
of defining the objects oflegitimate and proportional response to each variant of 
aggression, whether it be an armed attack on US facilities or an equally debilitat-
ing computer-assisted attack, and of providing functional targeting criterion to 
the responsible official, whether civilian or military. 
Executive Order 13010 
The key, then, to an effective response to the threat posed by States or groups 
engaging in attacks against US critical infrastructure must be the commitment to 
address the attacks they sponsor within the scope of the law of armed conflict. 
We must think of cyber aggression as a variant of terrorist activity. This is pre-
cisely the approach taken by the Clinton Administration. When President 
Clinton signed Executive Order (EO) 13010 onJuly 15, 1996, thereby estab-
lishing the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(CCIP), he declared that certain designated "national infrastructures are so vital 
that their incapacity or destruction ... would have a debilitating impact on the 
defense or economic security of the United States." The eight categories of 
critical infrastructure designated in the EO as requiring the development of a 
national strategy for protection include: continuity of government; telecommu-
nications; transportation; electric power systems; banking and finance; water 
supply systems; gas and oil storage and transportation; and emergency services 
(medical, police, fire and rescue). Chaired by Robert T. Marsh, a retired Air 
Force General, the CCIP was tasked with developing a comprehensive national 
strategy for protecting critical infrastructures from electronic and physical 
threats. On October 13, 1997, the CCIP issued the unclassified version of its re-
port, entitled "Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure." In 
addition to determining the challenge of adapting to a changing culture, the re-
port found the existing legal framework inadequate to deal with threats to criti-
cal infrastructure. The centerpiece of the CCIP's national strategy, then, is the 
domestic and international legal regime required to protect against threats to 
critical infrastructure. Although the report itself provides few specifics, on 
May 22, 1998, the Administration issued Presidential Decision Directives 
(PDD) 62 and 63 in implementation of its policy framework. 
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Presidmtial Decision Directive 62 
PDD 62, Combatting Terrorism, is the successor to National Security Deci-
sion Directive (NSDD) 138, signed by President Reagan on April 3, 1984, 
which determined that the threat of terrorism constitutes a form of aggression 
and justifies acts in self-defense.3o PDD 62 is more expansive in its coverage than 
NSDD 138 and addresses a broad range of unconventional threats, to include at-
tacks on critical infrastructure, terrorist acts, and the threat of the use of weapons 
of mass destruction. The aim of the PDD is to establish a more pragmatic and 
systems-based approach to protection of critical infrastructure and coun-
ter-terrorism, with preparedness the key to effective consequence management. 
PDD 62 creates the new position of National Coordinator for Security, Infra-
structure Protection and Counter-Terrorism, which will coordinate program 
management through the Office of the National Security Advisor.31 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 
PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, mandates that the National Co-
ordinator, established in PDD 62, initiate immediate action between the public 
and private sectors to ~sure the continuity and viability of critical infrastruc-
tures. The goal established within PDD 63 is to establish a reliable intercon-
nected and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003. A 
National Plan Coordination Staffis tasked with integrating the plans developed 
by the various departments of government serving as lead agencies within their 
respective areas of responsibility into a comprehensive National Infrastructure 
Assurance Plan, overseen by the National Infrastructure Assurance Council. 
The Council includes representation from both the public and private sectors. 
Under the PDD, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation's National Infrastructure 
Protection Center, established in February 1998, will continue to provide a 
control and crisis management point for gathering information on threats to crit-
ical infrastructure and for coordinating the federal government's response.32 
Targeting in the Context ofPDD 62 and PDD 63 
The issue remains, however, should the Critical Infrastructure Plan fail, what 
legal remedy can be applied under the law of armed conflict. If a response isjusti-
fied, what targets in a perpetrator country are proportional to the threat posed by 
destruction or compromise of critical infrastructure. Again, our experience in 
addressing terrorism must be reviewed. The reason this is necessary is that the 
flexibility of the law of armed conflict in addressing unconventional threats pro-
vides far more salient options than domestic law or intelligence law in cases 
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where the very fiber of our national security is placed at risk. For example, as W. 
Gary Sharp correcrly points out, an unlawful entry into and/or compromise of a 
critical national security system by an individual or individuals can be viewed as 
criminal activity under the jurisdiction of the federal and state law enforcement 
officials. The same intrusion by the same individual or individuals representing a 
State or international entity could be viewed as lawful espionage or intelligence 
gathering practiced by all States. If, however, that intrusion and the debilitating 
effect it has on national security can appropriately be characterized as an attack 
on vital US national interests, the range of options is grearly enhanced.33 
This is important because the State or group attempting to compromise US 
national security through the calculated sabotage of critical infrastructure is at-
tacking the nation, not with bombs or bullets, but ,vith the intent of destroying 
equally critical elements of national well-being and sovereignty. The loss of a 
power grid or of a US telecommunications network through computer gener-
- ated viruses for an extended period of time would have the capacity of placing 
more Americans at risk than a significant military threat. 
The United States was jolted into an awareness of the changing character of ag-
gression when its embassy in Tehran was seized on November 4, 1979, by Iranian 
militants who enjoyed the support of Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary govem-
ment.34 In August 1998, US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam were the 
subjects of unconventional warfare attacks, resulting in the significant loss oflife in 
Nairobi. In the attacks, a US response was only possible because of the linkage es-
tablished between Osarna bin Laden's organization and the assaults on American 
interests. The thrust of the new US strategy, oudined in PDD 62, must be to re-
claim the initiative lost while the United States pursued a reactive policy toward 
unconventional threats, especially those to its critical infrastructure. 
An examination of authorized responses (and the selection of appropriate tar-
gets) to techno-violence requires an understanding that cyberterrorism is a strat-
egy that does not follow any of the traditional military patterns. In fact, a 
fundamental characteristic of attacks on critical infrastructure is its violation of 
the established norm of information security. The only norm for cyberterrorism 
is effectiveness. While traditional international law requires discrimination 
among those affected by an attack and proportion in its intensity, the nature of 
information warfare and cyberterrorism is such that success is measured by the 
extent and duration of destructiveness to the systems targeted, ,vith no concern 
for those affected. In the contemporary language of defense economics, they 
wage countervalue rather than counterforce warfare. 
Why is this important? It is important because the only credible response to 
attacks on critical infrastructure is deterrence. There must be an assured, 
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effective reaction that imposes unacceptable costs on the perpetrators and those 
who make possible their activities. For domestic intruders, the criminal law may 
suffice. For those operating outside the United States, the US reaction must 
counter the cyber-terrorist's strategy \vithin the parameters of international law 
and PDD 62. Those who suggest otherwise neither understand the inherent 
flexibility of international law nor the cost of violating that law. 
In this regard, a case for a response in self-defense is not persuasive either on 
the political or legal level unless a reasonable basis of necessity is perceived. 
Those to whom a justification is addressed (that is, other governments or the 
public) will consider whether it is well founded; they will not regard the use of 
force as a purely discretionary act. An important dimension of this question con-
cerns the separate issue of when does action become necessary; that is, when is 
the use offorce necessary to enforce adherence to the norm of information secu-
rity. As Professor Lauterpacht has pointed out, every State judges "for itself, in 
the first instance, whether a case of necessity in self-defense has arisen," but that 
"it is obvious that the question of the legality of action taken in self-preservation 
is suitable for determination and must ultimately be determined by a judicial au-
thority or political body .... "35 The United States has long taken the position 
that each nation is free to defend itself and is the 'Judge of what constitutes the 
right of self-defense and the necessity ... of same."36 Similarly, more than a half-
century ago, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg noted that when a State has re-
sorted to the use of force, "if it has a good case, the world will applaud and not 
condemn its actions."37 
A Pro-Active Response to Threats to Critical Infrastructure is Authorized under 
International Law 
The decision to respond with force against techno-violence must be as 
closely tied to a clear objective as in the case where planning is conducted at 
the higher end of the coercion spectrum. Because the relationship between 
objective and threat is often unclear in the low intensity conflict arena, a strat-
egy to fight cyberterrorism must always focus on the underlying political pur-
pose of the State or group attempting to degrade or destroy an element of 
critical US infrastructure, whether that element be commercial, communica-
tions, intelligence, or defense-related. That purpose is unquestionably the deg-
radation of our critical systems such that we are unable to defend ourselves 
militarily or protect ourselves from serious political or financial overreaching 
on the part of our adversaries. How do we counter this purpose, this objective? 
Former Secretary of State Shultz was correct when he stated that US policy 
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"must be unambiguous. It must be clearly and unequivocally the policy of the 
United States to fight back-to resist challenges, to defend our interests ... 
. "38 Implementation of this pro-active policy requires that we make the fullest 
use of all the weapons in our arsenal. These should include not only those de-
fensive and protective measures which reduce US systems-vulnerability, but 
also new legal tools and agreements on international sanctions, as well as the 
collaboration of other concerned governments. While we should use our mili-
tary power only as a last resort and where lesser means are not available, there 
will be instances where the use of force is the only alternative available to elim-
inate the threat to critical civil or military infrastructure. 
Closely related to the legal question is the political question of linkage. When 
clear linkage to a supporting State exists, we must publicize that relationship and 
respond with discrimination in a manner calculated both to eliminate the cur-
rent threat while deterring the offending State from further destabilizing actions. 
The" center of gravity" in the offending State must always be that target or capa-
bility which most significandy undermines that State's will to continue to 
destabilize our critical infrastructure. Since cyberterrorism is a lesser form ofin-
ternational conflict and is bound by its rules, lawful response is properly limited 
to those targets which do not enjoy civilian immunity. Military targets may be 
preferable for two other reasons. First, the selection of military targets, while our 
adversaries are attacking our civil infrastructure in violation of international law, 
should not raise concerns on the part of other States. Additionally, selection of 
military targets would refocus attention on the fact that cyberterrorism and 
techno-violence are, in fact, forms of armed conflict. 
The thrust of this new strategy, outlined in PDDs 62 and 63, must be to re-
claim the initiative lost while the United States pursued a reactive policy to in-
cidents of information warfare which neither deterred cyber-terrorists nor 
encouraged successful response. The key to an effective, coordinated policy to 
address the threat posed by those willing to target our critical infrastructure is 
the commitment to hold those accountable responsible under the law of armed 
conflict. Full implementation of the two PDDs should lead to increased plan-
ning for protective and defensive measures to address this challenge to US na-
tional security, and, where deterrence fails, to respond in a manner which 
eliminates the threat, rather than treating each incident after the fact as a singu-
lar crisis provoked by international criminals. By treating cyber-terrorists as 
participants in international coercion where clear linkage can be tied to a State 
actor, the right of self-defense against their sponsor is triggered, and respond-
ing coercion (political, economic, or military) may be the only proportional 
response to the threat. 
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This pro-active strategy to the threat posed by attacks on our critical infra-
structure embraces the use of protective, defensive, non-military, and military 
measures. It attempts, for the first time, to define acts designed to destabilize our 
eight most important infrastructure systems in terms of "aggression," with the 
concomitant right of self-defense available as a lawful and effective response. 
The use of intemationallaw and, more specifically, the law of armed conflict, 
will not only complement the current criminal law approaches, but give pause to 
those who would target vital US interests. 
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